

REMARKS 107c

No. 41.

ON

BUTLER'S ANALOGY,

Sixth Edition, 1764—12.

GLASGOW.

Multum in parvo.

Printed and Sold by T. SMITH, CANTERBURY:
Sold also by B. LAW, in Ave-Maria-Lane; G. WILKIE, in
St. Paul's Church-Yard; and Mess. RICHARDSON and
URQUHART, under the Royal Exchange, LONDON.

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K. M. A. R. E.

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Second Edition, 1812.

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R E M A R K S

ON

BUTLER'S ANALOGY

Third Edition, 1864-1865.

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UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

PRINTED BY T. SMITH, 1864.

T O

His dear Kinfwoman Mrs. R—,

These Remarks on Religious Analogy

By the Bp. of Durham;

Though brief, the Work of Years and

Prelude of Eternity :

Are Dedicated

By Her most obedient humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR.

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[2]

REMARKS
ON
BUTLER'S ANALOGY.

NO book having afforded me greater pleasure and satisfaction than Butler's *Analogy*, I was induced in duty to make some remarks thereon in a careful perusal.

LET me observe that in endeavouring to reconcile religion to reason and observation (the drift of his work) he does not think it incumbent on him to reconcile thereto the dogmas of any, but to examine the scriptures themselves, regarding them as it's true genuine fount, and placing not implicit faith in any church. But, as it is necessary to attend divine worship, each person should join himself to that society he deems the most exempt from error; with this restriction, that (*ceteris paribus*) he ought to conform to the established worship of his country. Indeed a person should not leave it, unless he thinks he can change

~~it importantly for the better; as no one~~
 leaves a beaten road without being well as-
 sured of that he takes. This is the duty of
 a good subject, and what is due to ortho-
 doxy, and no more. For what is orthodoxy
 but the opinion of a number of persons at a
 particular time? and granting such particular
 doctrine excellent, it is bigotry to say it may
 not be in some respects erroneous and capa-
 ble of improvement.

RELIGION, it is universally allowed, can-
 not, from its nature, be reduced to mathe-
 matical demonstration: therefore our author
 introduces his work with ascertaining that
 credit must be allowed to *probable evidence*:
 not fearing to submit Christianity and all re-
 ligion to the test of reason, from whence
 vague indigested ideas settle into a stable and
 permanent opinion. Without a witicism,
 our courts of law admit that probability may
 be sufficient to condemn to death, as well as
 it is *the guide of life*. What is entirely with-
 out the ken of human reason cannot be cal-
 culated for mankind; which should not be
 discarded, though it cannot comprehend the
 whole. This well agrees with the excellent
 observation of Origen: "He who believes
 the scripture to have proceeded from him
 who is the Author of Nature, may well ex-
 pect to find the same sort of difficulties in it,
 as

as are found in the constitution of nature;" (p. 5) which may be thus illustrated.

EVERY one will readily allow that superior beings are endued with capacities as much above those of mortals, as those of the acutest men are above the generality of their species; and consequently that many of their operations might be as unintelligible to Sir Isaac Newton, as his deepest researches are to the generality of his species. I apprehend few can analyze light, even when explained to them. P. 7—"Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, as appearing to him the best."

THIS is as absurd as if a monkey was to think himself qualified to plan a cathedral, or as if a person should fancy himself acquainted with the universe, because he has some acquaintance with a parish; and is well exemplified in the fable of the man who took the management of the weather into his own hands, but miserable work of it he made.—
Thus much for the introduction.

PART I. CHAP. I.

P. 14. 'BIRDS and insects bursting the shell their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world.'

Break through their shell, and take their everlasting flight.

COWLEY'S Muse.

IBID. 'Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind with what we have already experienced.'

AND let it be contemplated what changes eternity may make.

NOTE on p. 15—'Conviction.'

Demonstration would have been a better word; for he by no means supposes it doubtful: God forbid! But to those unused to see reason instead of dogma this note may appear in that light.

P. 19. 'ALL presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded; and so, discernible.'

MILTON

MILTON (at the beginning of his poem) and others have entertained an opinion that death was brought into the world by the transgression of our first parents. Yet the 22d verse of the third chapter of Genesis may be understood in a sense not at all correspondent. Indeed a passage of the burial-service may be so understood; in which case their bodies were created immortal, and to have been inseparable from the soul; for aught we know, similar to what it may be when recovered to purity in the next world.

P. 22. 'OR if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death.

THIS seems to be a flaw in this excellent part. Surely this dissolution is subject to ocular inspection. *But perhaps I misapprehend his meaning.*

P. 22, 23. 'BUT after all; the relation a person bears to those parts of his body, to which he is the most nearly related; what does it appear to amount to but this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect each other? And the same thing in kind, though not in degree, may be said of *all foreign matter.*

PERHAPS this may lead incidentally to the cause of infectious diseases. As the matter which forms our bodies is fluctuating and desultory, that of one may fly off to that of another and infect it: thus inoculation for the small-pox is but conveying by art what nature often does of herself. Why it is in general worse in the natural way than inoculation, though the subjects are prepared alike, is another question. Perhaps through a more intimate union from a conveyance of more subtle matter in the breath; as some medicines operate more violently in infusion than substance. Unless the immediate communication with the vitals be the cause; or both.

IBID. 'If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments shew, and even the common observation how sight is assisted by glasses shews, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses.'

THIS is an excellent observation shewing that the ingenuity of man can apply extraneous matter provided by God, so as to assist even the nicest part of our own texture; either primarily, or secondarily when
it

it wants recruit. Pope's terming Newton an ape in his comparison of the sagacity of man to that of superior beings is here applicable. So apt are some as to make artificial bodily organs scarcely discernible from the natural, inso-
much that it has been ludicrously supposed that *new necks will be ere long to be purchased*. According to our author, as the soul may be said to lodge in the brain, the eyes are the organs through which she looks as through a glass. As she sees through them whilst we are awake; so in a dream, her holiday, she may be supposed to flutter an essay to break her bodily prison, not without some success. We are here naturally led to investigate the state of persons in appearance drowned, afterwards recovering; which in the thanks of the Humane Society to Dr. Hawes has been called Latent Animation. Such may possibly resemble that of persons in deep sleep. For some, of which number is Locke, are of opinion that the soul does not always think. Then the idea may be carried farther, and persons really drowned compared with such as are laid to sleep with opiates, and never wake more. Is not the appearance of the spirits of persons at their death applicable to the case of such suspended animation, as their visibility sometimes a little before it, previous to their quitting it entirely, seems to indicate that they sometimes hover off and on ere they quit it entirely?

and this idea seems confirmed in that these apparitions constantly precede or attend dissolution. Let me here notice, though not immediately to the purpose, that the quickness and instantaneousness of the journeying of ghosts is manifested in their being seen at different distances from the places of death at the times thereof. But these discussions may fall more properly under the question whether the soul enjoys a separate state, or lies dormant till the resurrection.

To return; perhaps the soul may be more properly accounted to pervade the vitals, though it may have its abode in the brain, heart, and stomach more especially. In the nerves it is that sensation consists; they are the essence of life: which accounts for the great sensibility of the stomach that is a bundle of nerves; an infinite number of which open into the heart. Indeed as nerves more or less pervade the whole body, life and sensation extend more or less through the whole, whilst it remains entire.

LET us close this remark with comparing the human body to a fortified place; naming the limbs the suburbs, the body the town, the head the citadel, and the heart its powder magazine; and the soul which is elastick and contractible, retiring within as occasion requires, to air. Thus the limbs are not necessary

cessary to life, nor the suburbs to the place: if the body be seized with the palsy, or the town taken, still the head or citadel may hold out, though a breach in either of them be critical. But if the heart is smitten, or the powder reached, it is all over at once: Bang!

P. 26. IN 'And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living beings were *very* nearly interested, is not their dissolution'.

I HAVE substituted *very* for 'most'; the heart especially, the smallest injury done to which is fatal, not agreeing with the latter.

I BID. But it is said these observations are equally applicable to brutes: and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak.

I HAVE in another place given my ideas on this matter, but will here add, that he who is afraid animals may attain everlasting happiness, deserves none but the appellation of *brute* himself: he is contemptible and invidious indeed. It is wrong to assert that animals are capable of religion; yet many are imprest with its substitute, good-nature.

Different

Different kinds, as well as those of the same, have very different qualities, and seem unequally deserving in both this world and the next.

B. 29. MILTON has noticed in *Paradise Lost* the probability that sleep would stop the wheels of life, 'till experience shews that it does not. See Adam's Speech, Book 8.

IBID. 'But in the diseases now mentioned there is not so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion as to the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affection; sense of a character, of shame and honour; and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp: and these surely prove greater vigour of life than bodily strength does.'

I HAVE here made a longer quotation than usual on account of its excellence. It goes near to prove that death (so called) is properly the beginning of life, and the incongruity of the opinion of the soul's lying dormant to the resurrection. It is true Locke denies that the soul always thinks: perhaps sometimes in sound sleep it may not. But at others

others it is so far from co-dormant that persons walk wrapt in sleep so deep and death-like that it is difficult to wake them; whilst the soul fulfils the part both of itself and the body which it actuates in so wonderful a manner, that it resembles *walking in death*. Besides, considering that man is a compound of soul and body struggling with each other for victory, the latter may be supposed sometimes to prevail in its province the earth, and lock up the soul in its prison of clay. But when liberated, it is extremely reasonable to think she will be endued with prodigious vivacity and agility: and I apprehend that the notion of the soul's sleeping in great measure overturns our author's Book of Analogy. At this moment an analogous thought comes across me; whether the pangs of the body at the time of death are not comparable to childbirth, and the consequent separation of the soul to infancy.

THIS is perhaps the cause why she is so loth to leave the body, afterwards hovering round it, according to an observation of Dr. Scott in his *Christian Life*, that spirits most frequently appear in charnel-houses; and somewhat, but indirectly, accords with Gray's lines,

*Left the warm precincts,———
Nor cast one longing, ling'ring look behind?*

BUT

BUT I find a thought (page 31) somewhat similar to mine, in these words, 'Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth, &c.'—He a little after says, 'Death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does.'

IT cannot be denied that *birth enlarges our life* of the womb, though into a helpless state that cannot be boasted of. But it may be supposed that the infancy of the next world will be superior to the manhood of this. But it is vain to attempt to pry into the secrets of the abyss of eternity; for, as I remarked on page 5, we should be unable to understand the things of another world, were they explained to us. Shakspeare, as capable of searching into them as any man, makes the Ghost in Hamlet say,

*But that I am forbid
To tell the secrets of my prison-house,*

THAT which is to be understood, of the confinement of the body only, is evinced by the apparition itself.

WITHALL I think it may be clearly collected from the beginning of the 12th chap. of the 2d Epistle to the Cor. that St. Paul did
not

not entertain the idea of the soul's intermediate sleep; and the term last general resurrection implies prior resurrections of individuals. But it is sufficient for man to know that humanity and virtue, joined with our endeavours to improve our minds here, will insure us an eternal progress of happiness heightened by knowledge hereafter; that this is a state of probation and education for futurity. In regard to the notion of our same bodies reinvesting our souls at the resurrection, I do not know any part of scripture that affirms it. St. Paul himself gives no direct answer to *With what bodies shall we come?* I conjecture our glorified heavenly ones will retain a resemblance of our earthly. Let me add that general resurrection implies a respective individual one. If our bodies fluctuate and change even here, why should it be supposed that the same matter, after a longer or shorter time of putrefaction, will rejoin the soul at the general resurrection? Perhaps the words of the Creed *The resurrection of the body* might be well changed for *The assumption of a body*. Respecting the condition of an intermediate state, or of that which will take place at the general resurrection, *it has not entered into the heart of man to conceive*. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe that a great alteration will take place at that third grand era, considering our birth and death as the two first. But how or where

we know not, but must rest content at present with *this visible diurnal sphere*; save that we may now and then flutter a little in our cage.

HE just afterwards glances on the possibility of the soul's sleeping; 'The truth is, reason does not at all shew us, in what state death naturally leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers; yet the suspension of a power, and the destruction of it, are so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the other', &c.

THE concluding observation is truly worthy of this admirable chapter on a future life; in which it is proved that atheism itself does not invalidate the doctrine of immortality. I will close my remarks on this chapter with an elucidating simile—Let the various * arguments in favour of the soul's immortality be considered in aid of our perception that *It is Divinity that stirs within us*, and let revelation be superadded: and for comparison, let a person, who has read the arguments in proof of the circulation of the

* See a Book, the title of which I forget, farther than that, among other articles, the existence of a Deity is contested between Eusebius and Theomachus.

blood, observe how they are corroborated by his own sensation of it, whilst authentick information is superadded. Who then could doubt?

C H A P. II.

P. 37. 'EVERY one observes the general course of things.'

IT is common to hear ignorant people say that life is as long in an unhealthy as healthy place, or rather they will not allow one to be healthier than another; which is denying causes to produce effects, the differences of situations, in respect to health, being clearly to be accounted for naturally.

I B I D. 'Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, and the honest man happy.'

I THINK *a general indiscriminate* would have better expressed the meaning than *bare single*. But, not to dwell on words, this supposition is extremely probable from analogy, as the best men, and among them the best princes, deriving their ideas from God (the latter being sometimes emphatically styled the
images

images of Him) concern themselves about the happiness of the good not the wicked: for we take human Free Agency for granted.

P. 38. 'But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature. True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature: i. e. not surely to the words or ideas, *course of nature*; but to him who appointed it, and put things into it: or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy called *natural*; and which necessarily implies an operating agent.'

I might corroborate this with a *quotation from Dr. Priestley in answer to an impudent atheist, William Hammon.

P. 40. 'BECAUSE the annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others.'

ADVANTAGE to some actions and punishment to others is better expressive of human laws.

I B. D. 'Civil magistrates' is here confounded with legislators, though the meaning is plain enough. The distinction between

* See the Critical Review for September 1782.

first

"first and second causes is well set forth in the succeeding part of this paragraph.

THE concluding sentence of p. 41—('For the whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing,') is generally true; though I do not fully apprehend the preceding reasoning. Not perceiving, for instance, that 'the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies, is an instance of his punishing our actions,' though it is of our being under his government, or rather protection. Had he said 'the pain we feel, upon doing what' *is wrong*, it would have carried that meaning; at least his expression in regard to our 'too near approaches to a fire, or wounding ourselves', tends but to prove that He has implanted in us an instinct of self-preservation, in my apprehension. The excellent adage, *Virtue is it's own reward*, here offers itself.

P. 48—'FROM suppositions, that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be incapable of offence and provocation.'

IF no beings committed 'offence' against God by opposing and thwarting his will (in which offence against Him must consist) there

B

could

could be no such thing as evil in the universe. To suppose God incapable of being provoked is to reduce the idea of Him to an indiscriminate and passive goodness, inconsistent with the nature of a Being who is the main-spring of the universe, and who, though revenge be an attribute unworthy of Him, we are repeatedly taught in Scripture to believe will dreadfully revenge the indignities and affronts He receives from flagitious men.

THE latter part of this chapter is truly alarming, and ought to convince the wicked who are

*Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway
That hush'd in grim repose expects his evening-prey;*

that destruction hovers over them, for that God will not save them in their own despatch.

C H A P. III.

P. 55. 'FROM the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society.'

VIRTUE and goodness have that stamped on them which will always distinguish them from vice and iniquity: And whenever the latter shall get the upper hand, the world will become a chaos of wickedness and horror.

When

When the best men are wantonly injured and abused, it is by a set of people without public sanction. As to legal persecution, though often horrid, it must not be laid entirely to the account of depravity, but of bigotted ignorance also. Some without doubt have promoted it, deeming it the cause of God. As the blood of murder is indelible, so the guilt of violence, injustice, and outrage is impressed on all mankind.

P. 56. 'THOUGH carried on by the instrumentality of men.'

(See p. 40.) THE question, whether the affairs of the world are conducted by primary efficient or secondary causes, seems to me as if it might be settled by analogy; by comparing it to a form of civil government established originally by a general code of laws, becoming in process of time when, many of the particular parts are perhaps lost, what is termed common-law; occasionally aided by statute or new laws of regulation. And remarkable eras, such as the appointment of the law of Moses, the captivity and release of the Jews, and above all the Gospel-Revelation, the phænomenon of Mahomet, &c. may be compared to revolutions in earthly governments. Before the appointment and propagation of the law of Moses, theocracy was perhaps more necessary than afterwards.

P. 59. 'CANNOT be got rid of' is not applicable both to 'hopes' and 'fears,' with both which it is here made to correspond in a two-fold expression.

IBID. 'And inconvenience' is added by mistake, making nonsense.

P. 60, 61. *Good* and *criminal* might be substituted for 'moral' and 'immoral', which words are not used, I think, in their customary signification.

P. 63. 'THEY (*i. e. happiness and misery*) may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline.'

How 'happiness can be distributed by way of discipline' I do not well comprehend; unless it mean that the temporary happiness of the wicked may make the misery of the good lie feverer.

IBID. 'There may be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow.'

ALL being naturally on the same footing, men in a general view start together for the goal: though by the course of nature they often suffer by the faults of others, by the debaucheries

debaucheries of their parents particularly. As for riches; though our Saviour's words cannot be taken strictly, as some must be rich, but must be meant of the wealthy by undue dealings; it may be at least questioned from his strong expression, whether they may not be for the most part really a misfortune to their possessors.

P. 64. ' AND indeed these other and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen.'

POPE says

Reason's the helm, but passion is the gale.

WITHOUT passions man would be a mere clod, a *caput mortuum*.

P. 66. ' AGAIN: put the imaginary case, that rational and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner.'

THIS is actually the case in some measure: witness the most wretched and inhuman savages (and see page 20.)

P. 67. ' So that rational animals have not necessarily the superiority over irrational ones: but, however improbable, it is evidently

dently possible, that, in some globes, the latter may be superior.

I THINK our author here deviates on the wings of fancy.

IBID. 'Instinct.'

THERE are not many more difficult investigations than what is 'instinct.' It must not be said that God immediately guides beasts, and such of the human species as seem actuated more by 'instinct' than reason, to wanton cruelties. And thus a strong argument may be fashioned for inducing a partial opinion of second causes, which indeed seems best to correspond with free agency.

IBID. 'Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages.'

THIS is experienced in the rise and fall of empires.

P. 68. 'By uniting a society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice.'

A principle

A principle of action is hereby constituted ; an object, a sea-mark is set up, to which all eyes are invariably and uniformly directed.

THE 69th and 70th pages are fine. There may be no barriers in other worlds of mountains, seas, and charts, nor various religions and governments to keep the good apart. — This happy effect of virtue would have a tendency by way of example, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them, who are capable of amendment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue in the 70th seems extremely just. Beings, not quite abandoned, would from receiving a more thorough conviction of its being the only means of happiness, as their knowledge advances, embrace it. The two following point out how the millennium might be established ; wherein I cannot help observing that he seems contrasting the present picture of Great Britain.

P. 74. ' Demerits.'

I THINK the sense requires *merits* or '*demerits*.'

P. 75. ' WHEN, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so that upon the whole, every one shall have his deserts ;

this distributive justice will not be a thing different in *kind*, but only in *degree*, from what we experience in his present government.

I AM afraid this will not hold in regard to many individuals, though it may at large. Every one surely has not his deserts here even in 'degree': I mean, though the inward tranquillity of virtue and uneasiness of wickedness, how weighty soever in the scale of the former, be taken into the account. This I think he has before acknowledged.

He need not have feared *to speak out*, since this life is nothing in comparison with eternity.

C H A P. IV.

P. 84. 'By religion's being corrupted into superstitions which indulge men in their vices.'

THIS seems to be a true if not new explanation of superstition. Men, unwilling to give up their vices, are for inventing a counterfeit succedaneum for true religion: not relishing the substance, they invent forms.

P. 86, 87. 'AND indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be put on such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty

a difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so, till we know the whole, or, however, much more of the case. But still the constitution of nature is as it is.

In pages 78, 79, is this remark: 'For the notion of a future account and general righteous judgment implies some sort of temptations to what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination'; to which he might have added *no field for desert*. That 'the constitution of nature is as it is', none will deny.

I will conclude this chapter with offering a thought arising from the term 'general righteous judgment', used towards it's beginning, considered with the inanity of this world, *the fashion of which passeth away*. Let none shallowly deem it impossible or improbable for even a beggar to be superior in glory even to a king in another state. We frequently see strange alterations in this; but in another it will immediately *bide its diminished bead*. School is little thought of after it is left. In this light perhaps St. Paul is to be understood when he says *we shall be all changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye*.

C H A P. V.

P. 89. 'EVERY species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and qualifications, of each species, are as necessary, as their external circumstances.'

MAY not the souls of some animals be intrinsically nearer an equality with the human than is imagined; but which wanting the advantages of bodily shape, are cramped in their action? Thus the idea of the metempsychosis might not be altogether destitute of a partial foundation. I mean that the soul of a brute might possibly be capable of animating a man; indeed had I a mind to be witty, I could adduce strong proofs of it.

THESE words just after 'change a man's capacities or character to the degree, in which it is conceivable they may be changed; and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life, and human happiness,' seem to favour this notion. And the change of the human voice into canine from the body's affection by the bite of a mad dog is as astonishing as shocking, and together with the degeneracy of the human soul into cruelty and callousness from habit, shews that its qualities are much dependent on circumstances.

On

On this idea it may be desirable to die before the soul suffers as to its faculties or vigour by age, ere the second and irremediable childhood. And those nations who demolish their old ere that period, may have better grounds for the practice than we are aware of.

P. 91. I HAVE abbreviated and altered this sentence, 'But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of them,' to *But habits are not necessary to the perception of ideas, though they are to readily digesting them*; not liking it as I found it; and doubting if it did not clash with, 'There are habits of perception, and habits of action' in the same page.

P. 96. 'He would be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and curiosity, and suspence.'

THE redundant copulatives used in this fragment of a sentence, discover in our author a knowledge of rhetorick—but for its substance, perhaps it may be applicable to the entry into another state, in a greater or less degree. (See page 29.)

P. 97. 'AND which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct.'

THIS

THIS tending to render the existence of human instinct itself disputable, I will say a few words to it.

INDEED it must be acknowledged that habit may be frequently taken for it : but I apprehend each mother to be convinced that infants are directed by instinct to the breast : which preceding use as well as reason is decisive. What are human appetites but instinct in common with that of brutes ? But it must be allowed to be greatly inferior, as is that of domestick animals to that of wild, in proportion as their reason approaches man's ; these qualities reciprocally supplying the absence of each other. It is very surprizing that birds of each species should build their nests precisely alike, an instinct not inherent in domestick fowl.

P. 98. ' For we do not discover how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body.'

I MUCH doubt whether physicians, apothecaries, and surgeons will admit this.

P. 102. ' So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love. And so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.'

I KNOW

I know not that the supposition contained in the first of these is admitted. As to the purport of the other: 'interestedness and self-love,' when blended with philanthropy, are commendable, nay they are necessarily inherent in every one, and may be termed a part of himself: otherwise they are culpable, and mark such as are homewardbound and wrapt up in themselves: in which they, especially the former, are generally understood. True self-love is the happiest quality in the world; and, the reverse of envy, derives pleasure to the possessor from every prosperity; taking tithe of every crop without lessening, but on the contrary improving it; and, like the bee, sipping every flower.

P. 108. 'And passing through the present world with that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds.'

A STAMPT coin bears the image throughout the world.

P. 109. 'NEITHER our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength, can be improved beyond such a degree: and both may be overwrought.'

WHICH

Which agrees with the beginning of page 103.

P. 111. 'AND I cannot forbear adding, though it be not to the present purpose, that the *appearance* of such an amazing *waste* in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, i. e. vice.'

I PRESUME that analogy is here erroneously applied, especially in regard to seeds (see the beginning of the page.) It is absolutely impossible, as it would be ruinous, for every seed to grow and come to maturity. For instance, much the larger number of grains of wheat are confessedly meant to be consumed, as are some animals, I think. The smaller quantity of the crops that is found sufficient to supply the demand for provision, in that proportion, is husbandry in an improved state; so that this observation has a tendency directly contrary to the drift of our author's argument. Were every grain to grow again, this staff of life would occupy the earth as the miser's wealth accumulates. But I will not spend time in proving what is obvious. This passage seems to shew the defectiveness of population instead of virtue: and whether the frequent necessity of making off with
puppies,

puppies, kittens, moles, &c. &c. superfluities of nature, be here apposite, I will not determine.

P. 112. 'VERACITY, justice, and charity.'

God may be said to be 'Veracity, justice, and charity' themselves. Who loves God, loves them; and who loves them, loves God.

ON the whole of this chapter it may be observed that the nature of things is such, that happiness will not drop into men's mouths; I mean the happiness of eternity. They are so constituted that we must earn it ere we have it, and receive it as our right. When we can lay a just claim to it, we may be assured a just God will not refuse it. Were the eternal like the present state, wherein prosperity is showered on some, whilst others are destitute; there would be reason indeed to complain. But this world *passeth away*, and justice shall appear, which, like happiness, but glimmers here below.

C H A P. VI.

P. 117. 'AND as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal necessity, will easily be seen; it will, I hope, as easily be excused.'

I HAVE

I HAVE left out 'I fear,' thinking it inserted by mistake, and the sense clearer without it. For I presume he does not mean that the absurd (so termed by himself) doctrine of fatalism can have weight enough to shake religion.

P. 118. 'Their difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this, but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely.'

THIS is irrefragable and excellent, and may be fairly carried on to the constitution of nature.

P. 119. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that *every thing* exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, on several accounts.

EITHER kind of universal necessity seems to me equally absurd and impossible. Common sense and the capability of reasoning itself tells us we have free agency. He that denies it must contradict himself almost as often as he speaks, and whenever he thinks. For God's sake let us leave reasoning, when we disclaim reason itself. *Ex nihilo nihilum fit.*

P. 123.

P. 123. 'AND therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life.'

WHICH is absolutely impracticable; that of which every day shews us the extreme foolishness, cannot be founded on truth. Universal fatalism is stoicism, scepticism, and nonsense, and exactly of the same cast with the affirmation that fire has not heat. (See Beattie's Introduction to Truth). It is as impracticable as incredible, and so must remain, till its assertors shew themselves utterly careless of precipices, wells, bombs, the depths of Etna or hell. If it be urged wittily that many, as well the believers of free-agency as necessity, actually are careless of the last, I answer that they endeavour to drive it from their thoughts. And there have not been wanting philosophers who have asserted that they would not avoid precipices or fires that should be in their way. The name of the founder of that sect does not at present occur to me, and I am sure I shall not set my mind to recollect it: but am sorry our author, of a very different cast, extends this chapter to so considerable length. He says (page 119) that he 'will not pretend to reason with those who deny that design, in the actions of men,

contributes to many alterations in nature.* And it is equally lost labour to reason at all with scepticks, stoicks, and fatalists.

LET me here observe, that the doctrine of transubstantiation is equally absurd with scepticism, and may be denominated *scepticism inverse*. The former affirms nothing, the latter a manifest impossibility which no one ever did or can believe.

AGAIN, *ibid.* 'This application of it always misleads us.' Our author forgets that it is impossible to be misled if necessity constrains us to a certain inevitable track. But I'll have done with absurdity, how ingeniously soever he argues on a system that blends strange chance with fate; a system, which being granted, we believe mankind irresistibly conducted in the course of nature, some to happiness and others to misery, without any kind of merit or demerit in ourselves, or others of our own species, or any beings whatever (for religion, which he proves not to be overturned by fatalism, is built on these different conditions of futurity) each from a point where he is dropt by incidental necessity, or rather necessary incident; for I know not a more proper appellation. Justice has, it is evident, no share in such a preposterous notion. The words, 'then though its evidence from reason would remain', might be changed

changed to 'then, though its evidence from reason would be *corroborated*,' which ensues from a union of reasoning. After all, it cannot be denied that there may be a partial necessity by which our bodies as well as our souls are actuated mechanically, or in other words act by an involuntary impulse, as they often confessedly do. That some animals, especially of the ferine kind, are to a degree regular machines, seems to be countenanced by their uniform instinct; which is perhaps a more philosophical notion than that the Deity is immediately their mover or soul. The strangest imaginations may not be utterly void of foundation, and this line may be generally applicable to the various schemes of pragmatism,

All neither wholly false, nor wholly true.

C H A P. VII.

Is not 'reciprocal correspondence' (page 138) tautology? And does not—'so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other' (ibid) verge on universal necessity discussed in the last chapter? To what I have said in my remarks thereon may be added, that the well being, if not existence, of the world, depends on a general first rule; though

it may at times somewhat yield to eccentric persons, and extraordinary circumstances.

P. 139. 'INDEED the natural and moral constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds; it is a reasonable supposition and excellent idea.

P. 143. 'NAY, it is most clearly conceivable that the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it,' appears paradoxical, though I admit the preceding part of the paragraph; because it may be wrong to obstruct free agency too much. He seems to adopt, at least to glance at the Mandevillian doctrine paradoxically. For though a preponderation of good may proceed from a wicked act (which does not come up to the assertion of Mandeville that *private vices are publick benefits*, yet surely, as it is worded, this sentence is a palpable contradiction, virtually as well as in terms. Not is the case, cited as a parallel in the next page, just. 'Many a man would', I allow, 'have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever.' But then they were not

not previously in a good state of health. Their bodies must have been posselt of pũcant humours, which some active disease was necessary to carry off, or some chronick one to absorb.

P. 147. 'For, these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self-condemned.'

THAT natural indelible discrimination in our minds between good and ill (see pages 47 and 61, and remark on 55) I have already insisted on is a sensible proof that it will remain. The hardiest villains find themselves unable to efface, however they may weaken it; nor was there ever one truly happy. Virtue and vice will indubitably be their own reward and punishment more eminently in futurity, when the trees planted here shall produce their respective fruits: for we see the beginning of this progress here, in those who make advances in virtue and tread the steps of vice. And to this analogy leads whether there be a God or not (see page 34) though it be itself a proof that there is.

P. 148. 'NAT ends, which, before experience, we should have thought such parts were

were contradictory to, and had a tendency to prevent.

A FAMILIAR instance of analogy to strengthen this may be drawn from a very familiar instance of a rookery destroyed on account of the damage done to the neighbouring corn: in which the farmers soon found their mistake, finding it afterwards devoured by vermin.

I CONCEIVE that, the more the arguments of this chapter are weighed, the more important they will appear.

Conclusion of the First Part.

P. 149. 'So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixt but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible.'

THE words 'middle of a scheme' remind me of a doubt whether the system of our sun be the central one of the universe, or one of many less placed about a principal centrick one. Of this we always must doubt below, unless a divine revelation declare it. Only it may be conjectured that ours is not the principal system, which is probably inhabited by the most glorified beings, and immediately

mediately by God himself: that numerous systems (numerous indeed, if each star is a sun) surround that grand one, and especial worlds roll round it's sun, as proportionally smaller ones round their respective suns, and ours among the rest; and satellites round their principals. God Almighty! how glorious is the luminary that enlightens and actuates the worlds that are the immediate abode of thy divine majesty, from whence thy influence is extended through immense space!

P. 150. 'INDEED, without an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be.'

HE that writes in proof of the existence of God and Religion neither ought, nor need be afraid impartially to examine the arguments on both sides, if human examination of unfathomless depths be not itself a burlesque. It may be affirmed, and must be admitted, that it is equally unaccountable to human capacity how God should be self-existent more than the universe. What then is to be answered? It is this: That we feel there is a God, that a *Divinity stirs within us*, which is seen instinctively to lift the eyes and hands of distress to its native heaven; however He came to exist. But surely it verges on blas-

phemy to mention a doubt whether He who occupies, pervades, and actuates the universe, nay who formed it; whether He who only *is*, whether the living God, exists. 'We feel that in Him we *live and move and have our being*. We know not how ourselves came to be what we find ourselves, (and even superior beings may not know how they came to be what they are) nor how any one animal or plant came to be what it is. The general consent of mankind, that is, common sense tells it us. And, the agreement of all theocratical revelation, (every miracle is a revelation) with that in the Old Testament, particularly the Jewish with the pretended Mahometan as well as Christian superadded, taken together, none but an idiot can doubt it.

P. 151. 'AND that we are now living beings affords a strong probability, that we shall *continue* so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think it will destroy us.' (See page 30.)

It must surely be granted that it is at least as probable that we shall live in a future state as that we should have been born from non-entity into this (see page 34) which consideration alone is an irrefragable reason for an anxious concern in providing for it. How would a man not mad that should see himself tottering

tottering over visible torments, shudder: yet they are visible to the wicked; they do behold them, and anticipate damnation. Hell is present to them; they carry it about them! And we see that some men would not desist from crimes were hell really and fully before their faces: witness those who in many countries run the most probable risques of speedy tremendous punishment. But is not the appearance of dead persons eye-evidence that their souls survive? To deny these relations of all ages is denying the evidence of our senses, is mere scepticism. Are the wicked then mad? Most certainly; if the utter perversion of right reason deserve that name. By what other name can the flagitious man be called, who without bettering his condition here (and it cannot be affirmed that it is likely he will, experience being on the contrary side) prefers the most rational probability, or rather certainty, of misery to that of happiness hereafter?

BUT to return to apparitions. Even supposing, according to the notion of some, which may be possibly true, though tending much to scepticism as well as miraculousness, so frequently repeated as to lose its name; that God, for particular purposes, such as the terror of murderers, and detection of murders, should present the images and voices of dead persons to the mind, this is itself an acknowledgment

ledgment of his existence and power, and a potent argument for the immortality of the soul. If God exist, as is herein allowed, it is extremely reasonable to believe he created us, *formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul*, with which inspired history acquaints us: (seventh verse of 2d chapter of Genesis, on which see Whiston) that he lit the mass of earth with particles of his own divinity, from whence it is natural to suppose that he should be acquainted with our thoughts, and intimately affect our imaginations. But whether he created us from nothing, or in what manner soever he did create us, it can neither rationally, nor without blasphemy, be doubted that the goodness of a God, immortal himself, induced him to give us immortality: especially if it be considered that an eternal God would not deem the point of time we call life worthy much regard, were it not essential to futurity. This will be readily acknowledged on reflecting that even wise men contemplate it with nearly indifference, or rather as a curse. And surely it is blasphemy to suppose a gracious Being to bestow existence, a general curse instead of a blessing. By a general curse I mean a curse to the generality of the species.

AFTER pressing it on the attention of the reader that our veil of flesh and blood hides much

much from our minds the deformity of wickedness, and of the hideousness of the evil spirits which bad men suffer within them to persuade them to prevail; and that, alas! when that shall be removed, and our spiritual eyes behold them as they are: when they, O woe-ful sight! shall behold fiends more hideous than scorpions and serpents, the causes of their past crimes and companions of their consequent future miserable existence; and the lost society of glorious and blessed angels shall aggravate the loss; that then no language can describe their wretchedness! It is not improbable that this view, not a phantom of my imagination but reality, frequently induces the repentance of criminals and sinners at their death, repentance that often invades them and drives them trembling to seek asylum and redemption for offences against their Saviour, *the burden of which is intolerable*, in his spurned sufferings. St. Paul, who, God be thanked! was converted long before his death, to the infinite advantage of Christianity, as well as of himself, is the strongest encouragement to repentance, and proof of the powerful efficacy of newness of life.

I SAY, after earnestly pressing these things on the attention of the reader; I will conclude this remark with an attempt to form an analogous syllogism on the truth of a future state; strengthened with the compendious
 considerations

considerations, that in the regeneration of animals, a resurrection in miniature, the like is experienced; and that in apparitions there is also experience, experience of eye-witnesses, that death does not put a final period to our existence; which last strongly confirms the natural notion that spirituality is immortal.

It is (at least) as likely that we may survive and regenerate in a future state, as that we should have been born into this—Therefore we shall live in another.

“P. 152. ‘Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and fears: since we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know of what higher degrees of both we are capable.’

HAD he said *we cannot but know that we are capable of much higher degrees of both*, it would have been a juster expression: But to proceed.

LET me analagously compare the first part of this treatise to the terrestrial first part of our life. But, my God! that contains half the book, when this life is less, without comparison

comparison less, than the first drop to the impending lineal rain. It is but the embryo of eternity. And here a thought comes across me, whether this life may not be in some degree analagous to futurity, as a seed is to a plant: they may be somewhat respective miniatures. Let me again press the consideration of immortality on the mind of the reader: that perhaps within a twelvemonth, perhaps within a month, perhaps within a week, perhaps a day, an hour, (inevitably a short space) he will be launched on the bosom of eternity, and see this world fled from him infinitely more swiftly than a sailor sees fly the shore he is leaving for ever. It will be gone like an arrow from the bow, and we shall say *Fuit Illium*—This in point of time.

IN regard to the different conditions of eternity, O man, consider well! Will you chuse God for your friend, who will forget no good action, nor leave it unrewarded; and become an angel of light; or will you be cheated by the devil to become one of the angels of darkness, who will hold themselves bound by no ties; who, like mortals deluded by them, have no principle to hold them together; but regarding no ties, are always contending one with another for power and superiority, as well as warring against God? Whether you will take your everlasting abode with Beings of ineffable excellence and glory,
or

or with taunting grinning fiends, monsters of horror and deformity?

P. 154. 'INDEED the whole account, how it came to pass, that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be beyond our comprehension.'

(SEE page 150, and remark.)

P. 155. 'It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life.'

AGAIN, let us consider this life as consisting of two diverging walks; one leading to Elysian-smiling scenes of Arcadia, and the other to frightful howling tracts of desolation and despair!

PART

P A R T II. C H A P. I.

Page 169. 'THE worship to the Son and Holy Ghost.'

IT is observable that the church of Rome implores the intercession of saints, as our's does our Saviour's; thus wrongly elevating them to the transcendent office of him.

P. 170. 'AND ignorance, whether unavoidable, or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will, just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as the other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases,' is, I own, beyond my clear comprehension.

P. 171. 'THE express, though figurative, declaration.'

Positive would, I think, have been here better than *express*; apprehending *express* and *figurative* to be sometimes words of contradiction.

P. 172. 'HENCE we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral in religion.'

MAY

MAY not an analogy be drawn between what is moral and what is positive in religion, and common and statute law? And it resulting from 'nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, received from him whose creatures and subjects we are,' at the end of the same and beginning of the next page, that as actions must be expressly mentioned to be made criminal by statute, so actions, not morally wrong, should not be holden condemned, unless strictly and clearly forbidden; besides that some precepts, such as are some in the Old Testament, may become obsolete, as well as some human laws: and to carry on the comparison, some of both may be annulled, either expressly or impliedly.

P. 175. 'Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion: as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of scripture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue.'

THIS

THIS of course reminds us of Popish superstitions (see page 84.)

IN regard to the last part of this quotation, 'that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue,' the truth lies in drawing the line between *morality* and *bigotry*, between due restraint and narrow scrupulousness. As propriety and decency ought not to be discarded through an idea of narrowness of mind, so the celibacy of divines ought not to be deemed a necessary part of *morality*, not of *religious morality*. Respecting the commerce of the sexes, a principal part of *morality* and *immorality*, the extremes of both ought to be equally avoided. A too strict morality becomes superstition, as neglect of it is dissoluteness, alike mischievous, if not alike criminal, in persons themselves. What shall we say of the continuation of Heathenism (I allude to the Roman vestals) in shutting up others in monasteries? O impolitick as well as impious tyranny! Nothing has obstructed the progress of Christianity more than dressing it in unlovely colours. That our Saviour was not a severe master may be collected from several parts of the Gospel, from his own words, where it was presumed to reprehend his conduct. Its characteristick is humanity, the contrary of persecution, if not of rigidity.

P. 176. In 4. And farther, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion any where, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly: a semicolon was put at *virtue*, and a colon at *folly*, whereby the sense was destroyed.

I HAVE to observe on the last paragraph of this chapter, that from the frequent difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of passages of scripture, reason must be our general guide, right reason, implanted in us by God; that we ought nevertheless to attend well to the revelations with which he has favoured us, both as corroborations of reason, and special guides in particular cases: unlike the Deist, who indeed believes in a God, an only God, but in no revelation of any kind; presuming the light of nature and conscience sufficient to direct every man.

C H A P. II.

P. 181. ' For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that the *whole* course of things, or divine government, naturally unknown to us, and *every thing* in it, is like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore

fore no peculiar presumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any thing in the latter.

Does not our author here argue himself against analogy, unless he only somewhat waves what may be called common natural analogy, by supposition of a new superceding spiritual analogy, corresponding with the Christian, and other prior revelations? Indeed he seems sensible of this objection at the end of the paragraph in the following page, making the concise distinction of things *visible*, and *invisible*. Yet, spirituality being connected with naturalism, and revealed religion rising out of natural accordingly, this passage, I think, perplexes his system unnecessarily.

IBID. 'Now, whether this power', *to the end of the paragraph.*

THAT is, whether both a *visible* and *invisible* analogy may not have been always carried on, and the latter at times more or less manifested below, as it will eminently and fully in another life.

'Is' should be *was*, and 'worlds' *the world*, in the first line of page 183, as I think the meaning is confined to the earth.

P. 184. 'It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was placed upon the earth.'

This brings to mind the opinion that *Christianity is as old as the creation.*

P. 185. 'For, if there be the presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts, what can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar?'

I do not apprehend the justness of this reasoning. Surely there is a more than a rather greater 'presumption' against (that is unlikelihood of its happening) a miracle, than a thing in the common course of nature.

P. 186. 'Magnetism and electricity.'

'MAGNETISM' especially is so very extraordinary as perhaps to belong to spirituality rather than naturality, or is perhaps the immediate link that unites them. What helps mankind to traverse this world seems to indicate another, and may be termed the Cape of Good Hope, whilst electricity is ethereal rather than terrestrial, and both may be compared with the sensitive plant.

P. 187. 'THOUGH it is not worth while to perplex the reader with enquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, which, without such enquiries, we see is of no importance.'

AFTER remarking that this quotation is so worded that it might be taken in a contrary meaning, I will conclude this chapter with observing, that it is in general sufficiently 'abstract', as well as complicated, already.

CHAP. III.

• BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme of it; against the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world; as well as against several particular relations in scripture.

OUR author's drift in this chapter is to shew the rashness of those who reject the Christian religion from an arbitrary presumption against it's probability *primâ facie*; who vaguely reject the idea in gross, without listening to its evidence; who refuse to call up witnesses, and hear it's merits: as distinguished from those, who, after an examination, or pretended examination, disbelieve it. Arrogant
D 3 presumption

presumption against Christianity is dangerous prejudice indeed!

P. 188. 'The purposes of tyranny.'

SEE remark on page 175.

IBID: 'There are persons, who think it a strong objection against the authority of scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing.'

It is sufficient to call the attention of those who cavil about the absence of nice correctness of scripture to the Eastern manner of writing. It's sublimity alone indicates it's authenticity.

P. 192. 'We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful.'

It has been often well observed that *certainly* would preclude faith.

P. 196. 'The magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies.'

It falls within the tenour of this chapter to compare the improbability, *primâ facie*, that the sun never moves from his place with the
hasty

hasty presumption against the Christian revelation.

P. 197, 198. 'It appears from scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner: and this is made an objection against their being really miraculous.'

ENTHUSIASTICK madness, being really the extreme of inspiration, is on the contrary the strongest proof of a miraculous gift. I am aware that enthusiasm is generally understood in a wild and bad sense; but there is also true as well as false enthusiasm. The true is not a pretended, but superior and highest degree of inspiration;

Ob ! 'tis too much for man, but let it ne'er be less !

SHOULD I be called a Methodist, I care not, little regarding names; especially as I hope a zeal for religion does not disqualify a person for the church of England: and will, however, venture to say, that lukewarmness cannot be very acceptable to God, nor lift the soul from earth. I do not well know what their tenets are, but believe that some of the rational amongst them deserve, in these

frigid days, to be emphatically termed religionists. Yet faith is but the shell of religion; and it is moreover a pity they take delight in childishness, as appears in Whitefield's hymns; such as calling the Holy Ghost, Dove, a more proper appellation for Cupid, in the manner he uses it; &c.

P. 201. 'Circumstances seem often to make them improper, where they are absolutely necessary.'

THIS is paradoxically expressed. He means that medicines are sometimes proper in one respect, and improper in another, as in consumptions, complicated cases.

IBID. 'After high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have.'

PREJUDICE is a direful bane, and only pardonable in being usually the folly of fools.

P. 202. 'And satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain, whether it would be successful.'

THIS exactly resembles the neglect of religion, it's benefits supposed not certain, both for want of duly strongly impressing the things on our minds. Would any but fools and mad-men forbear their endeavours to
shun

shun an evil, with a strong probability, at the same time, of obtaining a good? Besides, is any thing on earth certain?

P. 202, 203. 'REASON can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and evidence, of revelation.'

To which I beg leave to add, *of every thing respecting religion*, provided it be not with contumacy. For bigotted superstition is always at hand to fill it's vacuum.

P. 203. 'INDEED there are some particular precepts in scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts.'

It may be greatly doubted whether some such passages may not be spurious, judged from analogy: every thing is mixed in this world. Supposing wicked men made no interpolations, every part of it, except our Saviour's own precepts, which too might not be exactly in his own words, were liable to error; written, as they were, by mere men. It is sufficient that the body of scripture is excellent altogether, abundantly evincing it's predominant source (see the end of page 191 and 192; and Critical Review of Randolph's Scriptural Citations, for October, 1782.) It
being

being considered that men wrote the scripture, I hope it will not be deemed impious to apply this line to it also as well as other compositions, with circumspection :

*Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see,
Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor e'er shall be.*

He who considers the relation of Samson's tying firebrands to the tails of the foxes may be pardoned for deeming some parts fabulous. It does not appear that he was endued with Camillan swiftness, nor that they were bagged vermin.

C H A P. IV.

P. 206. I HAVE altered 'much less *that it is credible they are so*', to 'much less *convince that they are so*.'

P. 210. 'Though all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance.'

HERE is an assertion favouring strongly indeed of fatalism. If it was neither by 'chance,' nor necessity, nor (invisible) machinery inferring materialism equivalent to a substantial plenum, by which coins tost up fell some one way, some another, I wish to know

know what it was? But it is vain to answer, if words have no meaning. It cannot be supposed that Providence directs each and every other trifle; immediately superintends every gaming-table; and, if so, it would be a constant ordination amounting to such a necessitating materialism, plenum, or whatever appellation be given it, annihilating free-agency. The assertion I have always heard with disgust. If chance, incident, accident, hazard, with a score other words in all languages of similar meaning (*I mean what is called meaning*) have none at all, I should be glad to see dictionaries supply the place of faggots for a few gunpowder-treasons. A denial of an idea received by all the world is no other than a denial of common sense. And does not 'certainly' in this very quotation become nonsense *prima facie*? If uncertainty, which approaches to a synonym with 'chance,' be therefore without import, *certainly* is absurd, because used as a contrast of nothing. By way of illustration; I cannot imagine that throughout a campaign it is pre-ordained that such persons shall be killed at such instants, and others wounded in certain manners, by particular persons, &c. &c. But I imagine events to arise secondarily, whilst God superintends by *general laws*, and, thus indeed, holding all in his hand, doubtless often induces particular things in the course of nature, and sometimes miraculously

on

on extraordinary occasions; as some may amount, more or less, to miracles. **P. 211.** 'THESE laws are unknown indeed to us; but no more unknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as they are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man is so superior to another in understanding.'

I THINK our author again leans to fatalism. With regard to the last part of this quotation, there have not been wanting persons who have asserted, that the capacities of all are alike.

P. 212. 'YET there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions should be by general laws.'

THAT is by general *invisible* laws, as distinguished from *visible*. (See page 181.)

P. 213. Quoted objection.

It is remarkable that our author has not hitherto mentioned the devil; who, without doubt, makes it his business to disturb the works of God, whether appertaining to nature, religion, or morality, as much as is in his power, though sure to be subdued at last; which is a strong presumption of the analogy
between

between them. Yet, according to my remark on several places of this treatise, he, and his evil spirits, have never been able, amidst all their mischiefs, to efface, nor even greatly deface, the image of virtue. Nor have they been able to blot the beauty, or disorder the œconomy, of nature. I choose to mention here, that libraries have been written to reconcile the crosses of the devil with the goodness of God. Thus did the Ptolemaicks lose themselves in labyrinths of astronomy, through want of the true idea. Had Butler given into this notion, many difficulties in analogy would have been at once dissolved. Divines tell us of God's permitting wicked spirits to rebel against him, and induce all the disorders of the world; which to me appears nonsense, and irreconcilable with any free-agency in superior beings. If human kind possess it, angels must be supposed to possess it *a fortiori*. Acts entirely of permission are not free at all, though they may be subject to restraint, according with laws human.

CHAP. V.

‘THERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts.’

CHRIST,

CHRIST, in the language of scripture, both God and man, (from his superior and eminent endowment with the Divine Spirit) is in the very terms pointed out for an Inter-Mediator; the link joining earth to heaven. As to his sufferings and persecutions, even to death, being pleasing to God, merely as an offering, I cannot conceive it. Could a sacrifice favouring strongly of Paganism, that Paganism he came to abolish, be pleasing to God? It could not be so, otherwise than as the persecution both of Christ himself and his saints, in conjunction with miracles, tended eventually to his celebration, and the establishment of his religion. Thus the capital miracle, his resurrection, followed his crucifixion; a miracle proceeding from the extremity of persecution. Nor do I see how mediation and sacrifice are connected. Yet it must be acknowledged that Pagan sacrifice seems to have taken it's rise from the Mosaic injoined in the Old Testament, and that even the term *Priest* originated from the superintendence on sacrifice; whilst it is still as certain, that several texts of scripture, previous to, as well as contemporary with, or succeeding the time of our Saviour, reprobate it. It would be a very bold, if not rash idea, to attempt to reconcile these difficulties and contradictions by suggesting, that the word, sacrifice, in the Old Testament was never intended to be taken literally, but figuratively;

tively; though it is manifest that in 'the sacrifice of a contrite heart', &c. *sacrifice* is metaphorical. Sacrifices might be necessary at particular eccentric, possibly corresponding times, in a manner incomprehensible to human capacity. I say we dare not positively pronounce that not to be the case; though it is not easy to imagine the good effects of innocent victims in general, and it is perhaps too free an opinion that they are more calculated to please the devil than God; much more; unless from a beneficial tendency, as I before observed; which is somewhat analogous to nature, as by contrast it is that the fruits of the earth are produced. It is, however, the least enlightened part of the world which persists in the practice at this day. It is, moreover, certainly of a dangerous nature, as, the more dear an object is to a person, the more meritorious an offering he may deem it. Thus the old and young of the human species have been immolated, as well as animals; mankind by mankind. The story of Abraham and Isaac cannot but here occur. It is obvious that the notion has been, and is now, productive of the worst abominations in many parts of the world. Yet let me repeat, that there might be something in the nature of things beyond our narrow comprehensions, rendering it necessary that transcendent excellence should suffer for the sins of others (for I have admitted a partial necessity,
or

of fate.) I say as a necessary sacrifice, not propitiatory requisition; the last more agreeing with the attributes of the heathen deities, than of a good God.

P. 218. 'But they,' &c. (to the end of the period.)

See page 210, concerning first and second causes.

P. 219. 'We are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil.'

Which is, I think, generally understood to have been the case before the fall.

P. 220. 'Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all; no one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good.'

This doubt is nearly analogous with whether a power of pardoning criminals should

be lodged in a state, as in the crown of Britain.

P. 221. 'HOWEVER, there would be large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal consequences prevented.'

This will but just agree with the last quotation, and is in favour of such a power.

P. 224. 'A SUPPOSITION' (namely, of the world's being in a state of ruin) 'which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, (and which, if not proveable by reason, yet is no way contrary to it.'

It is from hence inferred, that God's general invisible government includes occasional provisions (see page 220.)

P. 231. 'He (meaning Christ) exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by his Spirit.'

THE Spirit is, I deem, more properly God's. Indeed our Saviour promised to send the Holy Ghost, but I apprehend his true meaning to have been, that he would procure *his* (allegorically *his*) mission; if the Holy Ghost be considered as the spiritual emanation

tion of God, in which light most of the texts of scripture become sufficiently intelligible, but otherwise are not in any degree. How, for instance, could God, *whom no one has seen at any time*, be seen in the likeness of man; and how could God be said to send his son, that is himself, or part of himself, however it be termed, according to Athanasius's system of the Trinity? (See pages 202, 203, and remark.) Christ's true character, in regard to the power with which he is invested, seems to be that of a temporary viceroy, emphatically *temporary*, till * time shall be lost in eternity. This also agrees with the tenour of scripture: (See particularly our author's quotations, pages 208, 209.)

P. 232. 'How, and in what particular way, it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain: but I do not find that the scripture has explained it.'

It must be owned that my observation in the remark on the beginning of this chapter (that

* It is strange that
 * As in beginning was, is now, and shall be evermore,
 should be continued the burthen of our psalm-singing, in a church whose doctrine of a final consummation it contradicts, and is, withal, the half of a miserable ditty.

the

'the fruits of the earth spring from contrarities of weather') but slightly accounts for the persecution and prosecution of a transcendently righteous person to death.

P. 233. 'OTHERS, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining his office, as Redeemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government of the church.'

SEE the said remark at the beginning of this chapter.

P. 234. 'AND there is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind; that the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world represents God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty.'

INDEED this objection might be carried farther, to the affirmation that God chose to punish the innocent and righteous, did not the voluntary suffering of our Saviour obviate it. But the truth is, that it might (that our Saviour himself was of that opinion must be presumed) have peculiar efficacy, more than would have resulted from any other event, as on this followed the eminent miracle of his resurrection. That the Romans had been im-

pressed with an idea of voluntary representative punishment appears from the story of Curtius.

I HAVE already declared (see remark on page 150) that, in my opinion, he who writes in defence of religion, ought not to shun any argument which may be brought against it, which candour is practised by our author. I now add, that he ought neither to shun the mention of any such circumstances. It may be said, that both Curtius and Regulus exercised admirable virtue, equal to that of any meritoriousness of our Saviour. But what if Christ did not excell particular acts which could not be excelled? Yet he did excell these, for he laid down his life for his enemies.

Does not the former part of page 235 clash with the last of 41, on which I have remarked?

P. 236. 'OR else, they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience.'

One might shape the dispensation, in regard to our Saviour, into a scheme of retributive justice, by saying, that in reward for his vicarious punishment he is invested with viceroy dominion. (See pages 208, 209.) But I own, I think it would be an unsatisfactory, and

and unworthy doctrine, and that those quotations are to be figuratively understood; however, I think they cannot strictly; and our author observes, that they are but ‘imperfectly comprehended.’ The *rule, authority and power* the Son is to *put down* may mean Satan’s rule and the powers of darkness, and his ‘*reign*’ may mean the millennium.

P. 237, 238. ‘LET reason be kept to; and if any part of the scripture-account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shewn to be really contrary to it, let the scripture, in the name of God, be given up.’

THIS is a bold and unexpected sentence, bordering on rashness; especially if it be considered that Christ’s suffering for the world does seem contrary to reason. We must look deeper than human notions of reasonableness to account for it.

P. 238. THE constitution of the world and God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation.’

See remark on the introduction (page 5.)

C H A P. VI.

P. 243. ' ESSENTIAL of natural religion.'

NATURE and conscience inform, for the most part, what true religion is, which the Christian revelation certifies and improves.

P. 244. ' NOR is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with.'

I PRESUME there are no Christians in this enlightened age, who think salvation confined to one religion, much less to one church.

P. 245. ' IT is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to place creatures of like kinds in different situations: and that the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations, and even the same creatures, in different periods of their being.'

THIS

THIS quotation presents to the mind the endless variety of the shades of nature, whence an analogy may be drawn thereto.

P. 246. 'OUR present state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat past, which we are wholly ignorant of; as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than is necessary to practice.'

WERE we to deviate on the vague wings of Fancy, we might adopt an idea that the contradictions, the mixture of good and bad qualities in human kind, partaking of every thing, and in whom all extremes meet,

*Sole judge of truth in endless error burl'd,
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world,*

may proceed from an alloy in our constitution, implanted by the devil, who had been long at war with God, who might presume his interest in man strong enough to be set in competition. But, as I have more than once observed, the indelible stamp of God is evident amidst all the confusion and wickedness of the world.

P. 247, 248. 'THUS, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference.'

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P. 247, 248. 'THUS, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference.'

There is a Divinity that stirs within us.

P. 248. 'For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done him the greatest favour; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person: no one, who had any sense of gratitude and prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situation with regard to such person, as if he had no such doubt.'

This is an important observation irrefragably just, and ought to make the name of Jesus dear to almost infidels.

P. 249. 'Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness.'

This points to unpardonable scoffs at religion. The unmad libertine will have this to say in defence of his course of life,

*Amo meliora proboque,
Detriora sequor.*

P. 249, 250. 'NAY, considering (considered) the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly, may see, there is not near
so

so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are fully convinced of it's truth, and to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be true.

I WILL endeavour to illustrate this position on one side of the question only, the care of avoiding future punishment; for the importance doubles if the joys of heaven are placed on the other.

Suppose there was but the slightest probability of stumbling over a precipice into destruction, how careful would any but an idiot be to avoid it! Again, how justly careful is each prudent person of what is emphatically called the *main chance*, meaning an economical attention to worldly concerns! But how much more emphatically is everlasting welfare termed the main chance!

P. 255. 'Now when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they would do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of perfection.'

DIFFICULTIES of some kind are in the term clearly necessary to probation; and the greater and more complicated they are, the higher is the virtue that surmounts them.

P. 258. 'AND they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures.'

THIS must be allowed, as far as common sense goes. They taking the existence of a God, and truth of religion for granted; I have sometimes thought that practical sermons are the only kind proper for them, and that those of a nature any way abstracted, and which enter into proofs of fundamentals, are more hurtful than serviceable, in starting doubts they would never have thought of, and which they are not adequate to canvass. For I cannot agree to the beginning of this paragraph, especially as I think these words, 'those, I mean, of this rank, who never think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it', contradictory to it.

P. 262. 'Several of the observations here made, may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men.'

THIS is somewhat of the complexion of my last remark.

I will close this chapter with observing, that this treatise should be frequently read and weighed, that a proof of religion may go hand in hand with each occurrence of life. And let me repeat, that the author may perhaps seem to some too *candid* to unbelievers, in contra-distinction to *dogmatical*.

C H A P. VII.

P. 264. * THE Old Testament affords the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses and of the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And the gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them.

THIS is an admirable correspondent observation, affording alone a proof of both the Mosaick religion, which was natural religion, that is the worship of God in contra-distinction from that of idols, heightened by revelation in the stupendous theocracy of the times, and the miracles here spoken of, and *revealed religion*, that is the Christian, especially so termed. For in the word *revelation* *re* may be considered as importing *happening again*; and, by the way, it appears an heterogeneity

generousness and imperfection in our language that it does not in all. Theocracy and revelation approach to synonymousness, and may be even inverted; the Gospel not being the only light communicated to the world, but a fresh and more distinct one in a new shape. Theocracy, that is the miraculous manifestation of God without the intervention of second causes, may be termed revelation; and revelation, such as the glorious angelick vision at our Saviour's birth, and the descent of the Holy Ghost on the Apostles, may be termed theocracy. For that God ever appeared personally cannot be understood, for we are expressly told, that *no one has seen God at any time.* (See remark on page 150.)

Having mentioned idolatry, I cannot avoid observing, that there is nothing so surprizing and unaccountable as that rational beings should worship monstrous and hideous images. If it be not worshipping the devil through fear, it must be set down to the account of extreme superstition of men bewitched by priestcraft. It cannot be urged that such audacious figures are intended to supply materiality to the Deity, whereby religion is better suited to beings consisting of soul and body, like mankind.

I PROCEED to a small digression concerning the infidelity of that wayward race the Jews. Did they depend on the return of the Messiah to
bless

bless the whole world, instead of denying
 that Christ was the Messiah, and made his
 first appearance as foretold, that part of the
 prophecies, namely, concerning his suffer-
 ings, was then fulfilled, and that the re-
 mainder, *Peace on earth*, will be com-
 pleted at his return, we should agree. Even
 at his first coming, though he did not bring
peace, he preached it. Or, not to let a word
 continue a difference, I do not perceive the
 important ill consequence of their dissent in
 regard to the appellation Messiah, provided
 they agreed to adore the name of Jesus
 Christ, the like to whom will never be seen on
 earth till his return: but let the name Mes-
 siah be reserved till then, if they please. On
 the supposition of his return previously to
 the final resurrection the scriptures become
 reconcileable, (for *'Coming on the clouds of
 heaven' may be figuratively descriptive of the
 day, that is, time of judgment.*) When our
 Saviour declares *his kingdom not of this world*,
 he may be strictly understood to speak of his
 first coming; and our author's quotations
 (pages 108 109,) may be strictly understood
 of his second. The inspired writers abound
 in sudden transitions, comprizing into a
 point the things of various and distant times;
 or even burst the bounds of *this visible diurnal
 sphere*, speaking at once of our Saviour's first
 and second coming, and blending past, pre-
 sent, millennium, and scenes celestial yet be-
 yond,

yond, perhaps in the same verse, in the same breath, *as the Spirit gave them utterance.* They had propitious moments, lucky flights of *enthusiasm*, of predictions, which themselves would not have been able to explain. What is beyond humanity must be by fits. It may catch sparks of divinity as they mount, but they must soon go out. (See chap. 3, part 2, particularly page 192.) We are wont to forget, that men, imperfect like ourselves, were the vehicles of revelation. That they were always nearly the same, since the flood however, the similar styles of the Old and New Testament make appear.

THE Jews must grant, that the Old Testament, their only scripture, does not fully explain the efficacy of our Saviour's coming towards everlasting life, that therefore more information seemed wanting, which the New has given satisfactorily; and among other, that of his return to bring it. On this scheme of a second coming, and consequently on our Testament, Mahomet grounded his religion, which demonstrates that he, and his believers after him, thought the idea not inconsistent (to say the least) with the Old Testament. But the Jews, wiser than all, wander, not live, on the face of the earth, without possessing a foot; yet every day preposterously expect the whole, in contradiction to the progressive analogy of nature. They do not
consider,

consider, that God may occasionally alter the plan of things. It is the opinion of many, though an absurd one, that the revolution of the earth received a great alteration for the better at the fall; and it is certain, that he afterwards found it expedient to destroy nearly the race of mankind. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that the continued vagabond condition and uniformity of visage of this people is very amazing, and a standing miracle, (see Spectator, No. 495) and that various passages of scripture appear to promise the resumption of their kingdom, unless they are construed to allude to their return from Babylonian slavery.

P. 267. 'FROM the very nature of human affairs and human testimony.'

WHEN 'human testimony' shall be discarded, there will be an end of governments and administration of justice.

P. 296. 'IT does in no sort appear, that Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles, i. e. public ones: for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles.'

MAHOMETANISM being mentioned, let me say a word of the enmity of Mahometans to Christians.

Christians. It is observable that Mussulmen do not speak against our Saviour himself, though they give Christians the appellation of dogs. The case is this: they acknowledge Christ to have been a prophet, but inferior to Mahomet, who was emphatically the true one. Then because we deem Christ the true one, and even pronounce theirs an impostor, they name us dogs. They, exasperated at our calling Mahomet an absolute impostor, whilst they at most denominate Christ comparatively so, in return for our entire rejection of their prophet, bestow on us that term of reproach. We disgrace their worship more than they do ours; and, on the other hand, they are more opprobrious to us, than we to them. And, alas! it is too true that we disgrace our own! As to the conduct of Christians, how melancholy is the consideration, that whilst they pretend to adore their Lord, the generality of them glory in spurning the memory of his humility; in their manners much more resembling Mahometans, who act up to their religion infinitely better! Perhaps the pride of the dignified Christian clergy, which I particularly allude to, is greater than that of any set of men in the world. Yet, for the sake of their function, I will not therefore affirm they are the most contemptible; though, it is certain, that our Saviour demonstrated his true greatness of mind in his contempt of worldly grandeur.

But,

But, indeed, he belonged not to this world, for which he was too good, much too good!

It has been contended, that it is necessary for the dignified clergy to maintain pomp, worldly pomp: for that the times are altered, that the condition of Christianity is quite changed, since it is established and raised into importance. I do not deny that it is right that stipends should be annexed to the offices of the church, how shameful soever is the accumulation of pluralities; though I do, that it is right to spend them in feasting, extravagance, vanity, dissipation, and parade, and exactly in the same manner as the incomes of the laity in a frivolous age; so that religion is become but a name, *as sounding brass, and a tinkling cymbal*. Were the clergy to spend a large share of their incomes in charity, appearing themselves in zealous humility; those means which raised Christianity to repute, would not fail to maintain it therein. If hypocritical piety, palpably hypocritical; if the garment of sanctity, the shell of religion, be still efficacious in the church of Rome, how prevalent would be real piety and charity! Is it not continually in the mouths of rich and poor that they are careless of every thing but their dues, that they are more intent on their tithes than the laity on their rents, whilst a becoming application of them never enters their minds? It is not prejudice

that inspires the dislike to the clergy, as the contrary is manifest from the respect and reverence paid to the memory of Wilton Bishop of Mann—But my warmth has led me into digression.

THESE considerations much lessen the pleasure accruing to good Christians, in the observation that, from its own excellence, the Gospel has of late years widely extended, whilst the Alcoran, if not on the decline, is at a full stand. Another cause of the dissemination of Christianity is, that the most enlightened part of the earth is it's seat, which is also a strong presumption of it's truth. O that whilst the part of mankind the most eminent for arts and arms are Christians, we were in peace and friendship one with another! Though each shudders at the actions of Cortez, it is much owing to his abilities, not cruelties, that the new world abounds with Christians, such as they are; whilst it contains not a Mussulman. Mahometanism, that burst like a blaze, will probably expire from it's falsity, or inanity of it's prophetick fires,

*And, like the baseless fabrick of a vision,
Leave not a wreck behind.*

Whilst Christianity, gradually spreading to enlighten the world, and to which this line,

Prima

Primâ dicte mibi, summâ dicende Camenâ,

is applicable *mutatis mutandis*, like its eternal prototype, may be termed, Alpha and Omega.

P. 272. 'THEY allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives, for the most idle follies imaginable.'

LET it be attended to, that there are two kinds of enthusiasm, a false as well as a true; that, as the latter may be flighty even to madness, so even the former may hurry persons into extravagances resembling it. (See remark on pages 197, 198.) For, as the poet says,

*As some of wit
Want still as much again to manage it;
And again,*

*Great wit to madness sure is near ally'd,
And thin partitions do their bounds divide.*

INSPIRATION is more truly so described. As the false is often the greatest of absurdities, and sometimes of curses, the latter is *all of heav'n we have below*. It may be sometimes

also partaking of both kinds, and consequently of the conveniences and inconveniences of both. However, I think, it must on all hands be acknowledged, that there has been such a thing as inspiration, which, be it observed by itself, is a positive proof of the existence of one or more superior beings, leading directly to that of him denominated God. I say inspiration, whether true or false, proves the existence of higher beings acting on mankind. I presume, that to such action is to be ascribed the sudden elevation or depression of people's spirits, often otherwise unaccountable.

P. 274. 'AN account so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it.'

See page 272.

P. 275. 'AND as naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth, in what they say.'

NOTWITHSTANDING the sophistication of human nature, let me compare the youthful mind to *snow unsullied by the southern gale.*

I HAVE often thought, that, among the several causes of women being more amiable than men, one is, that native truth is less corrupted

corrupted in them through their exemption from the commerce of the world. It is certain that mankind are in general debased by involution in business and worldly affairs; yet, as some good often proceeds from ill, pride is abated by the same means.

THE force of argument at the latter part of the 276th, and beginning of the following page, is excellently ingenious, and peculiarly favourable to the miracles alleged in favour of Christianity, the evidence for which much overbalances that against them; which is not the case with those in proof of the truth of any declared religion, except the law of Moses, which the Gospel was intended to supercede. Yet, on the supposition of Mahometanism being an imposture, and even the religion of the devil, it might be granted, without injury to Christianity, that it was revealed by small miracles. For so powerful a spirit may be supposed to have had some degree of supernatural influence on the earth, as he has been supposed capable of creating animalcules and animals up to a mouse.

P. 277. 'TILL this be made out, the *natural* laws of human actions require, that testimony be admitted.'

OR else let the courts of law and justice be shut.

P. 277, 278. 'It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe.'

Coins attest that there is such a thing as true history, and the Christian being interwoven with the last ages of the Roman, both histories are jointly proved by some of the *Roman: and in saying that 'one knows not what to believe', it is granted that *something is to be believed*. As to exceptions of 'matters of religion', nothing can be more unreasonable: on the contrary it strengthens history, as congruous with the 'existence of a God, generally acknowledged from the light of nature.'

P. 282. 'YET is to be remembered farther, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, in much the same manner as Christians now.'

LET me repeat and press it on them that the prophecies of the first coming of our Saviour are fulfilled, and let Christians, in their

• I wish some antiquarian would make a collection of these proofs, especially in Roman medals.

turn,

turn, candidly and freely own, that the whole scriptural account of the Messiah, consisting in prophecies of events seen imperfectly at a great distance, as through a perspective, or by glimpses, as objects from a camera obscura, is not; and let all observe how strongly the Christian history in particular is confirmed by this circumstance. (See the last remark: and compare the first part of the third section of this chapter with remark on page 264.) The correspondence of the evangelists has been always deemed to confirm the Christian history.

P. 284. 'HENCE may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, that the prophetick history is applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before, falls in with the same remark.

P. 286. 'FOR what indeed can be said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject?

INDEED the stupidity and obstinacy, or both, of many, is such, that a wise man thinks not of entering into argument with them.

P. 288. 'For natural religion may be externally revealed by God.'

I THINK *confirmed* would have been a more discriminative and proper word.

IBID. 'THAT God, to the end of the paragraph.

AN antiquarian, deep searching, is justly delighted if some jewels reward his labours. I observed on page 263, that it is not improbable that some parts of the scripture may have been interpolated. So some may have been lost, and others omitted at one time, and resumed with additions or diminutions by conjecture or design, translating or transcribing. But, notwithstanding, he who selects the gems, will be sure of accumulating a sufficiency to form an everlasting crown of glory.

IBID. 'Doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts come under the same notion.'

DOCTRINES and precepts of revealed religion arise indeed from, and are grounded on, matters of fact.

Quotations page 292.

SEE conclusion of remark on page 264.

THE

THE 293d, and most of the following page, appears of imperfect meaning, for want of finishing the thread of the discourse with the mention of the express promise of our Saviour's return: but in what manner it will be, it is in vain to conjecture; either as to the final consummation, or what may precede it. It is a sufficient practical knowledge that the time (what is termed the day) of judgment and retribution is an event to be ardently wished for by the righteous, and dreaded by the wicked.

P. 296. 'AND that it's chronology, it's account of the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences.'

EVEN the stories of the poets corroborate the history of the Bible. Who, for instance, can much doubt but that of Deucalion's flood took it's rise from Noah's. If such relations were entirely of their own invention, the antients, with all their simplicity, were much more ingenious in fiction than the moderns, and knew what was lying.

* See Gulliver's Travels.

But

But I see our author has a like observation below.

P. 298. 'AND whilst they were under their own kings, in their own country, a total apostacy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole government.'

THIS was actually the consequence of their apostacy in rejecting the improved religion of God, declared by the mission of Christ his representative.

P. 300. 'NOT only without any assistance from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions.'

IT may be objected that *persecution* was the very thing that promoted it, agreeing with various experience. But this, though it has much truth, can never reach to overthrow, much less to set up Mahometanism in its stead, that rose under the auspices of power, which possibly some may contend for. To which objection the true answer is, that, in general, power is the surest means of propagation, and persecution the next; and that neglect tends to oblivion. Thus Christianity itself, without a continuation of supernatural assistance (and miracles in a manner consist in their infrequency) might, according to the course

course of things, have much sunk. Nay, neglect and oblivion are nearly allied, and but few shades apart, the words gradually falling one into another. Thus forgetfulness succeeds neglect, disregard forgetfulness, and oblivion disregard: a fire goes out without supply. But though persecution advances truth, a vigorous one often overturns falsehood, which has been the case with several impostures; as the furnace that clarifies gold would destroy base metal. Again, the persecution that would root out an opinion in its infancy, may strengthen it when it has made some progress; as the breath which extinguishes a kindling flame, increases a blaze: and some valuable new doctrines may have been thus extirpated.

Now, it appearing that the encouragement of the eminent professors of a religion, is, in fact, the encouragement of the religion itself, and the same being the case with neglect, it is highly incumbent on the patrons of preferment to bestow them on worthy and zealous persons. From this kind of neglect it is, that the lukewarmness of Protestantism, since it is no longer persecuted, proceeds, especially in this country: and highly criminal are those who contribute to this neglect, for in it they shew a contemptuous disregard of the sacred founder of our religion.

IBID. *Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by-word, among all nations, whither the Lord shall lead thee.*

SEE Spectator, No. 495.

STANDING miracles being mentioned, let me observe here, by the way, as a proof of supernatural agency, running up into the proof of a God, that one evidently exists at Langley-heath, near Maidstone, in the indelible footsteps of two persons, said to have met in a duel.

IBID. 'Intermarriages.'

A QUESTION concerning strange women and pork in disguise here arises.

P. 301. 'No. It is only the event itself which is offered to be thus accounted for; which single event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would have not have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not.'

Our author shews here, as usual, great logical penetration:

IBID.

IBID. ' THOUGH the event itself, his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain.'

THESE words may be construed to a meaning of which I believe he was not aware.

P. 302. ' THINGS of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of this prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this sacred government.'

METHINKS he writes here with the air of a Jew. It is a pity he did not a little explain his idea of this future kingdom, whether he had the millennium in his eye, or what. What is that? asks the reader. Still the vague conjectures of the curious entertain the attention, as those concerning the inhabitants of the planets. (See the first quotation and remark in this chapter.)

P. 304. ' OF much greater indeed, upon having them at first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for that purpose.'

THIS

THIS familiarization is applicable to all the great truths of religion, to heaven and hell, and is the reason why sermons, though the most forcible, make so little impression; the mind naturally growing callous, and a culpable inattention being moreover general.

P. 305. 'AND that such as are fanciful, in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favour their peculiar follies.'

It cannot be denied that there may be slight and fanciful, as well as important and serious, circumstantial evidence.

P. 306. I HAVE altered 'But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in it's consequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other', to *But then his practice should not be influenced, even though his opinion be affected; considering that a mistake on one side, may be, in it's consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. Much more dangerous indeed!*

IBID. 'Unprejudiced reason.'

Or rather *sound determination*. For prejudice in making sure of everlasting happiness,

is wisdom more than that in favour of one's country.

P. 307. 'It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to shew, in a short and lively manner, that this, and another thing, is of little weight in itself; but impossible to shew, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view.'

An observation of Swift here occurs, that it is very easy to ridicule religion from the especial heterogeneousness of sacredness and buffoonery. And to this quotation in particular, and religious evidence in general, this couplet is applicable,

*'Tis not a lip or eye we beauty call,
But the joint force, and full result, of all.*

CHAP. VIII. and Last

Is intended to obviate any general objection that may be made in gross against reasoning from analogy, and consequently this whole treatise.

P. 309.

P. 309. 'AND that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.'

To this, *virtue is it's own reward*, is an answer *prima facie*. Therefore, 'interests and pleasures' are here to be understood in a bad sense, in their worst sense of *selfishness and lust*, in opposition to generous beneficence, and the beauty of holiness.

P. 310. 'THE thing wanted, what men require, is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, at least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting.'

WHAT we know of God may be humbly imagined to be of his mind, which, though infinitely superior in degree, must be supposed the prototype of man's. I mean, we cannot apprehend either the being of spirits, that is, how they exist, or their agency, though the scripture assures us that God created us according to his own image, and that of his spirits: for that there were spirits companions of God, and resembling him their glorious chief, is manifest from the 26th ver. of the
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the 1st chapter of Genesis. *And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.*

P. 312. 'If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is; therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens it's force, in proportion to the weight of such objections; but also shews it to be false, or is a general presumption of it's being so.'

This is begging the question, in direct contradiction to the weight of analogy.

P. 313. 'It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any farther than to shew, that the things objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent with justice and goodness.'

SEE remark on quotation page 213.

P. 314. 'For instance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their actions here.'

As divines have, with great force, contended for future retribution, from what may
G seem

seem to militate against our author's system of analogy, in that virtue and vice do not receive their deserts in this life; it is proper to say a few words to it, whereby these different arguments are reconciled and stand together. If the inference of these divines was construed so as to unhinge this treatise, *Virtue is it's own reward* (always understood even in this life, though the inclusion of futurity adds infinitely to it's strength) would fall with it. The truth is, that the virtuous, though in general happier than the vicious here, are not proportionably so to their merits; and that therefore they have the best reason to expect a fuller reward beyond the grave, from the fixt immutable predominance of virtue, constituted by God in the nature of things, from which order and justice will at length proceed. It is true that St. Paul affirmed Christians to be *of all men the most miserable* without the expectations of future reward: but that was at a time when they suffered the most cruel persecutions.

P. 316. 'YET it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections' would be clearer if altered to 'yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really *the ground of* such objections.'

IBID.

Idem. 'And whether it be, or be not eligible, to live in this world.'

It must be confessed, that a good man cannot have much satisfaction 'in it', and that the reward, or, not to seem to quibble, the happiness of virtue here, consists, both in regard to others and himself, in the well grounded hopes of religion.

P. 319, 320. 'THUS I have argued upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe, and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do believe, the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which I apprehend as certainly to determine the divine conduct, as speculative truth and falshood necessarily determine the divine judgment.'

THIS opinion of our author, though very different from that of necessity, yet resembles it in uniformity, and is the most adequate rule of administration we can conceive to be laid down by God; by which he governs in a manner analogous to that in which a good prince, absolute by it's constitution, governs his kingdom. Addison (Freeholder, No. 2) observed, that 'King George the first, from his inclination to justice, ruled his German subjects in the same manner, that our constitution directed him to govern the English.'

P. 321. 'YET the very same difficulties might be raised, as are now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness.

But If I understand this distinction, it is, that it might be disputed how they came to exist, but that it is clear they do exist.

Would not 'And we should' following be better *Though we should*?

Our author's candour is great at the end of this chapter.

CONCLUSION.

P. 325. 'THEY decide God's moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice.'

The fool (the modern fool and villain) has said in his heart, there is no God.

P. 326. SHOULD not 'but it' be *that it*?

The *Conclusion* being a summary of the whole, I shall pass to the concluding sentence. 'If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act, as if they had a demonstration of it's falshood; there

there is no reason to think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.'

It would be no merit in them but the effect of fear, should they be induced to it by one's rising from the dead before their eyes.

As no one but an idiot can doubt of the existence of a God, after perusing the first part of this treatise, if he did before; so none but a very weak person can doubt of the truth of the Gospel, after reading the second.

DISSERTATION I.

On Personal Identity.

IT is well said at the beginning of this Dissertation, The question whether we are to live in a future state is the most intelligible as important one that can be expressed in language; but I doubt whether the middle paragraph in the next page is better than a quibble; conceiving, that if personal identity be not the same with consciousness, it depends upon it. To be sure, consciousness does not constitute identity, but it ascertains it. It is that without which it would be null; it is that which will bring home to our breasts, *Well done, thou good and faithful servant.* One line of Dryden's Ovid, a little altered to apply, seems more satisfactory than all that has ever been written thereon, in regard both to this and the next life; as thus,

• *The soul is still the same, the matter only chang'd.*

• These are the words of Dryden,

The soul is still the same, the figure only lost,
agreeing with the Latin,

Sed tamen ipsa eadem est, animam sic semper eandem
Esse——

MAN bearing the image of God, it will certainly remain the same in his future life, unless the wicked be converted to devils, as the righteous will be glorified to a brighter resemblance of him with the addition of wings, though the particles of matter will be changed, as they are said to change in this: there all deformities will be rectified, and youth renewed,

For that which never is to die, for ever must be young.

If I apprehended, and remember Locke's idea, it was this he entertained in his contest with Stillingfleet. Not to mention the fabulous idea of the renovation of the Phoenix; the annual one of snakes, and beautiful revival of butterflies, are analogies before our eyes of what I have suggested; and the visible disfigurement of evil in the present, affords a strong presumption that it will continue the same effect in a future state.

P. 337. 'THE enquiry,' &c.

To be sure, it is the soul that efficaciously and truly identifies man; and trees, nay solid dead substances for ought we know, may retain only their figures, at least some of their particles of matter may change.

P. 338. *Whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the same identical substance?*

A thinking intelligent being?

The sameness of a rational being.

To the last of these definitions Locke might have added, *in respect to the mind or soul*. Our author observes on them, that the question then is, whether the same rational being is the same substance? which needs no answer, because being and substance in this place stand for the same idea, which inference I do not comprehend; nor does it, I think, agree with Locke's doctrine of identity. Does not *being* mean one's person or self, and *substance* only the component matter, or, at least, may it not be so understood, not being a decisive word? I apprehend our author means by 'in this place', the passage in Locke from which he makes these quotations, though it is not clear in the expression whether he may not mean this part of his own treatise. Be that as it may, I have, on account of the ambiguity of the word *substance*, substituted *matter* for it at the close of the preceding paragraph, reading thus, 'The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of *matter*.'

From the last line of this page to the end of the paragraph, our author well exposes the

the futility of laboured nonsense. But I think I have made the expression clearer by substituting *though* for 'yet', and in two places *concerning* for 'of', as the *ofs* were applicable to the thinking faculty, as well as the constituent quality thought about, thus being ambiguous. It will then run thus,—' *though* in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses *concerning* one and the same thing or object; concerning the same person, self, or living agent.' *Objects* in the plural is a mistake of the press;

The quotation at the end of the 339th, and beginning of the 340th pages, and the consequence, is mere scepticism of nonsense, as our author treats it.

P. 341. 'This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to come.'

Almost as foolish as Locke's denial of secondary causes, or Pyrrhus's of all, whose
name

name is now come into my head, (see remark page 119) for they are two absurdities much alike. He that posseth of the sense of smelling denies that a rose emits a scent, will probably soon doubt, if the rose itself be a reality.

P. 343. 'If the person, or he, be the property of a substance; still consciousness that he is the same property is as certain a proof that his being remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the substance would be: since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another.'

THIS I cannot agree to, but apprehend it to be a mistake proceeding from his wrongly, as I think, using *being* and *substance* as synonyms, as in page 338. I have therefore ventured to alter it, having also reversed his expression at the beginning, making it run thus: *If successions of matter are still the property of the same person, or him, the sole consciousness that he is the same is as certain a proof that his mind or soul remains, as the superadded conviction of his being the same materiality would render it, since the soul cannot be transferred from one being to another, though the same property may possibly in various ways.* The soul is individual, to which the fluctuating matter continually and constantly belongs, (see page 20.) For a familiar illustration, a snake
that

that annually changes its skin is, notwithstanding, still the same creature, because each successive one is still alike it's property. Nay a person's changing his apparel is similar, and a snake's skin may, by a ludicrous metaphor, be termed it's cloaths. (See second section of the first chapter.)

IBID, last sentence. 'For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to expect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves.'

THIS is an excellent and conclusive answer to such as would reason away their senses, and to which it is but justice to Butler to notice, that Beattie is considerably indebted for the basis of his *Essay on Truth*, unless they are both indebted to some prior author.

DISSER.

DISSERTATION II.

Of the Nature of Virtue.

VIRTUE, the restrained offspring of too kind and indulgent nature, whose hands are justice and humanity, firmly binds together it's votaries; whilst wickedness, for want of a principle of union, wages intestine war with herself, as well as with her rival. But having several times (in chap. iii. part 1 particularly) touched on this subject of the moral principle, I shall be the briefer here, (see the advertisement at the end of the observations on this dissertation) yet must press it on my readers, for the sake of virtue herself, for the welfare of all with which that of each individual is interwoven, to settle, cultivate, and improve this principle in themselves and others. He who attends not to that which God has implanted within him, but suffers it to be sophisticated and debased, is guilty of greatly culpable negligence at best: He who suffers it to be effaced is deplorable indeed. I tremble for him on whose breast the handwriting of God is perplexed with the scroll of the devil. Without this legible tablet, without the stamp of virtue religion of eye elevated to something superior, controuling and regulating humanity, stands not firm, but feels her foundation totter. Even false religion

religion, even superstition, which is a preposterous kind of religion, is necessary to human government as a succedaneum where the true is wanting. Thus when in opposition to this moral sense of things, rulers attempt by law, or form of law, to subvert order, and confound right and wrong; then, according to Locke, Nature takes the alarm, and will, or ought, to resume her delegated authority, and take the reins into her own hands; let no people or person be quirked; according to the poet,

*Nature will her own laws dispense,
When law jumps up and rides on justice, right,
and sense.*

YET does the same Locke in his famed essay tantamount to deny an innate principle in human kind. That virtue contains intrinsic and indelible excellence *Probitas laudatur et alget* testifies. According to Fielding, who defies the world to make a charitable action ridiculous, it is impossible, in the nature of things, to despise virtue, though she may be overlooked; and the reason why she is often low, is owing to her being much, perhaps too careless of worldly concerns: Sprat laments that such men as Cowley should wish to withdraw themselves from them. But great souls in fact overlook worldlings of all denominations, much more truly than they
are

are overlooked by them, and have higher views than earth, the tinsel of empty grandeur, and fleeting phantoms of inanity. But I was about to say a few words concerning Locke's assertion, that man has no *innate ideas*, and premise that a proof of one such overturns it; his undertaking to prove a negative.

It is a modern remark, that several have *lisp'd in numbers*, confirming *Poeta nascitur non fit*, the adage of the antients: If not, I ask whence poetry proceeded, how the thing came into the world: as to musick, it may indeed, with some appearance of reason, be alleged, that birds were it's first masters, and to wave verbal contentions, I do not object to admit that what is emphatically termed an *ear to musick* (latent till it's strings are stricken in concert with those of the instrument) is not *innate idea*, but *innate susceptibility of idea*, peculiar to its possessors? Be that as it will, it is utterly impossible for art to supply that which nature has not imparted. It is strange that any should totally deny to man what they allow a magpye to possess in an eminent degree. Yet, as it is conceived by some, that the Deity immediately operates on animals, *innateness* more clearly belongs to man: In him the seeds of *ideas* are evidently sown by the hand of nature. I think those who deny it allow him *instinct* notwithstanding: but are

not

not *instinctive* and *innate* synonyms? (See page 97, and remark.) But language founded in common sense is to be annulled (see page 210, and remark) the words *genuine*, *inborn*, *innate* itself, with various others of similar meaning, are to be expunged, and the word *nature* itself to be deprived of much of it's import. Does she not begin to work in the womb; may not the intellectual faculties be impregnated together with the material by the immediate action of God, or second causes; resembling cloth dyed in grain; as Cowley makes Pindar say of Hercules,

*Nature herself, whilst in the womb he was,
Sow'd strength and beauty through the forming
mass?*

MAY not the qualities of the mind, as of the body, be hereditary? May not the one be warp't as well as the other? All know that they are intimately united: *Mens curva in corpore curvo*. Socrates was a rare example of a victory over the bent of nature, of vanquishing the evil *bred in the bone*. Common-sense offers her quiver of arrows to her advocate. Voltaire says, "Locke prevailed against his learned opponent, because he knew the temper of his weapons:" but he who contends with Common-sense, will sooner or later be found like the viper contending with the file. Let it not be understood that I mean to com-
pare

pare Locke to a viper otherwise. On the contrary, I would venture to slip a flippant nurse against him, who would oppose her child to the arms of his most gigantick champion. The safe, beaten, experienced track of nature forsaken, we deviate into labyrinths of scepticism and nonsense. *If we believe not the things which we have seen, how shall we believe those we have not seen?*

This opinion may have proceeded from confounding the terms *idea* and *knowledge*, in other words, the ground of knowledge with knowledge itself. We are endued by nature with original idea, the foundation on which variety of knowledge is built. The mind is the soil, idea the tree planted, and knowledge the branches. For instance, when a person says I had no idea of doing so or so, because I had no knowledge of what had happened, *idea* and *knowledge* are plainly distinct. Opportunity is requisite to any considerable degree of the latter; still some is confessed to be intuitive, for thus the common expression *opening the ideas* implies previous possession. Perhaps the thing would be better understood, were the word *notion* substituted for *idea*. *Notion* has a distinct acceptation from *knowledge* in a sentence which is also strongly in favour of my hypothesis. 'We have a natural *notion* of a Deity imprinted on our minds, *Naturalis atque insita est in animis nostris*

Dei

Dei notio. Should it be said that a *notion* is an *imperfect knowledge*, it is not incompatible with my hypothesis; but rather it is but the clue to *knowledge*. Our minds are at first both narrow and imperfect, susceptible of expansion and improvement, like a bladder. Had we no *innate ideas*, a person excluded from the ways of men would be an idiot, which would not be the case; he would have a glimmering of *knowledge*, some light from nature, from the mind's eye; he would be only ignorant more or less according to the size of his intellect. Parson Adams is an instance of my meaning.

I am sorry the * Critical Reviewers, who are not wholly destitute of either sense, learning, wit, or language, in whose fugitive chaoses something is casually seen worth stooping for (which I have quoted myself where I thought they deserved, and see Beausobre and L'Enfant) in examining Ld. Monboddo's *Metaphysicks*, deny *innate ideas* in which that of bent of genius or turn of mind is involved, arguing dangerously and atheistically. In their Journal for November they say, "This conduct has not, however, been entirely free from inconvenience. Those, who were conversant with material substances, soon lost sight of any other; and as, in their progressive series of causes and effects, they only ad-

* November and December 1782.

vanced from one kind of matter to another, they were unwilling to believe that any other than a material cause existed; and yet afterwards adopt this philosophy themselves; a philosophy which has led some mathematicians to believe nothing unless subjected to pothooks and hangers. Let materialists trace matter till they rarify it to the air of the Andes, still it will never assume living spirituality. Indeed, strong liquors are metaphorically termed spirits, from their partial resemblance in subtlety; but in regard to the essence, the quality of spiritual beings, they are as distant as inanimation from high animation. The soul (metaphorically so called) of a plant, is quite different from that of an animal. Yet subtle matter is that which comes in contact with spiritual beings, and actuated by them actuates that which is less rare, and so downwards to the grosser substantial parts. Materiality is so entirely different from immateriality, as not possibly to run up into it: as well might *mortality put on immortality*. To this effect his Lordship observes, that if the movers be infinitely multiplied (*refined*) yet there must at last be an intelligent agent from which the whole originates. Sublimate of mercury has no more understanding than

St. Alban's makes this distinction; 'The spirits of animal bodies are all in some degree kindled; but inanimate bodies have spirits no whit inflamed.'

brick-

brick-dust, antimonial wine than treacle, nor phosphorus and the northern lights than a coal-grate. The Reviewers inculcate that dreams are not to be regarded, because in sound sleep, when the mind is most emancipated, we scarcely have any; intimating withall that it hence appears, that the mind or soul is not of the excellence many imagine, but is highly indebted to its connection with the body. But I deny the datum they require, apprehending that, though less frequent, they are then the most important. A dream of * deep sleep past, we lament that after a glorious excursion we find ourselves withdrawing again into earth and it's low cares. They are unacquainted with the dignity of dreams who call the vagaries of indisposition or morning, but *the dreams of dreams*, by that name. Perhaps the readers of these gentry would not complain did their sleeping thoughts now and then furnish a criticism. But how futile soever theirs may be, I believe those of many to be extremely interesting and forcible, though their impression and memory often wear off. Even the great matter-of-fact-man, whom it is so much the fashion to extoll and laugh at, talks of the nightly visitation of the muses, though with little reason, God knows. Upon the whole, at the same time that they discover their want

* See The Despair in Cowley's Mistress.

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brick-dust, antimonial wine than treacle, nor phosphorus and the northern lights than a coal-grate. The Reviewers inculcate that dreams are not to be regarded, because in sound sleep, when the mind is most emancipated, we scarcely have any; intimating withall that it hence appears, that the mind or soul is not of the excellence many imagine, but is highly indebted to its connection with the body. But I deny the datum they require, apprehending that, though less frequent, they are then the most important. A dream of * deep sleep past, we lament that after a glorious excursion we find ourselves withdrawing again into earth and it's low cares. They are unacquainted with the dignity of dreams who call the vagaries of indisposition or morning, but *the dreams of dreams*, by that name. Perhaps the readers of these gentry would not complain did their sleeping thoughts now and then furnish a criticism. But how futile soever theirs may be, I believe those of many to be extremely interesting and forcible, though their impression and memory often wear off. Even the great matter-of-fact-man, whom it is so much the fashion to extoll and laugh at, talks of the nightly visitation of the muses, though with little reason, God knows. Upon the whole, at the same time that they discover their want

* See The Despair in Cowley's Mistress.

of inspired genius, they have treated his Lordship very scurvily, and deserve a certain species of discipline that would reach them the rigadoon, which Voltaire learned before them. In truth, they injuriously pass over, dream over, after their style of dreaming when awake, satirize, or malignantly squint at all productions whose leaves come to their hands ungilt with something more substantial than metaphysics. I will not join with those who confer on them the appellation of harpies, and yahoos; yet, on the strength of the precept

A little learning is a dang'rous thing,

Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring,

I pronounce that their bundles ought not to be suffered to go abroad for several reasons. It is unjustifiable for them perpetually to fill their box, not of charity, but freebootry, with filcht snuff, or rather, like mice, to skim the milk pans of every dairy for the cream of wit. But that is nothing: they now infect it with the perfume of atheism, thus possessing many of the Plebeian herd of literature, who at second hand *sip their learning from them*, and may be shortly expected to *perish in the waters of perdition*. But if they are still permitted to make their depredations, I advise the squinters to make a critique on Pope's sarcasm on Addison.

THE connection that the opinions concerning *ideas* have with his Lordship's work (of which however I pretend not to judge competently, farther than that innateness of ideas, the basis of morality, and the platonick dignity of the soul, are meritoriously contended for therein, a dignity of doctrine involving it's immortality) has led me into this digression, to which I subjoin the lines alluded to, altered from Cowley:

Down I laid my head,
And my freed soul to wond'rous regions
fled.

*Ab! sottish soul, said I,
(When back t' it's cage I saw it fly)*

*Fool to resume thy broken chain,
And row thy galley here again!*

P. 344. ' But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought.'

AND I think it plain that ' brute creatures have' it in some degree. For instance, when dogs are terrified or delighted in dreams, analogy informs us, that it is the repetition of somewhat past to their fancy, their mind, which occasions their terror or delight, as we experience in ourselves. Then by another analogy or inference it is extremely probable,
that

that if things past recur to them in sleep, they do likewise when they are awake. That they have memory is allowed, and indeed it is in many instances wonderfully retentive; and I do not conceive how reflection can be separated therefrom: if they are not the same, they are nearly akin. Memory generally is *cursorory reflection*. Remembrance, for distinction, may be defined *the return of the mind to particular things, or things past*, which is exactly *reflecting* in many words, the *re* both in remembrance and reflection signifying again, or over again. That brute creatures associate ideas is also manifest. What fills a dog with glee at his master's taking in his hand the stick he uses to walk with, but the association of the idea of walking with it; and what is it but a like association that makes a horse watch the vessel used to hold the corn given him?

P. 345. 'SINCE it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning nearly chimerical.'

SEE page 210, and remark.

P. 347. 'Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer.'

THIS

THIS seems no better than a quibble, as *catching the plague* cannot be properly said to be an action, but rather an accident; unless an action can be passive: nor could *infecting another with it undesignedly* be properly called an action. But should one infect another with it designedly, it would be thought right that the 'doer should be made to suffer.' If the mistake lie not in my own apprehension, I am sorry for the opportunity of observing that adepts in logick are fond sometimes of spinning their arguments into sophistry, whilst they hamper themselves in cobwebs (see the former part of this page.)

P. 348. 'AND thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment.'

THIS is very just and important.

P. 348, 349. 'FOR vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from thence appear, to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation: but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him proof against common temptations.'

THIS

THIS is oddly expressed, yet is perhaps intelligible. Speaking negatively, our author represents irresolution in torture as a 'temptation' to procure ease by avoiding pain. Yet I think this but ill falls in with *vice consisting in the absence or want of the virtuous principle.*

P. 349. 'BECAUSE such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes.'

THIS I cannot entirely agree in. Are not brutes differently inclined, in a manner much resembling, if improperly termed morally; thereby incurring just reward or punishment? Do we not for instance call one horse good and another ill-natured; and when we speak of a good or bad one, do we not regard his disposition?

P. 350. 'IT deserves to be considered whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so?'

I THINK 'without reason' hurts the sense. It may be answered comparatively that it is deemed highly criminal to murder one's self. Some divines say more so than another, because in the former there cannot be repentance: but, however, the crime is not on that account absolutely greater than the other.

P. 353,

P. 353, 354.

I wish from 'The fact' to the end of the paragraph had been omitted, because unintelligible, except on the doctrine of Mandeville.

P. 355. 'Nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has directed.'

See remark on page 203.

I THINK *avoid*, or a word of similar import is omitted by mistake in the print between 'to' and 'what' in the eleventh line of the last page.

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DEEMING the denial of *innate ideas* a doctrine extremely dangerous, for the reasons I have given; I propose, should these remarks be well received, to examine Locke's arguments particularly, in addition to this work, or as a distinct piece: Yet, as our author says of *personal identity*, I think it superfluous. What I have written thereon rose spontaneously to my mind.

† I think Butler's expression is not always the best, the most readily comprehended. I say not always; though it be for the most part well adapted to the subtle closeness of his reasoning, and both his style and manner gain upon us, the more conversant we become therewith, if he sometimes prefer clearness to elegance. He is rather too precise in pointing, often making a stop even between the verb and it's immediate preceding or following substantive. But if he be rather too precise and sometimes faulty in that respect, some of our best writers are more so in not sufficiently discriminating the stops, not seldom satisfying themselves with a series of commas, where one or more semicolons would render the sense greatly readier, if not clearer. Nice correctness in pointing is more easily comprehended than described, (See the end of Lowth's Grammar.)

† But see page 320,

F I N I S.



